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STORAGE WARS: ANALYZING THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE SCA’S
WARRANT PROVISION
Peter Liskanich*
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation has historically forced the expansion of
substantive law. For example, industrialization and the expansion of
railroad systems led to major expansions in property law, tort law, and
employment law, while the creation of the printing press prompted the
development of copyright law.1 But laws and regulations generally do
not keep pace with the rate of technological change. Today,
technology is evolving at a faster pace than ever before and legislators
are struggling to keep up. As Professor Vivek Wadhwa points out,
regulatory gaps exist, and as technology advances ever more rapidly,
those gaps grow increasingly wider.2
The driving force behind innovation of the Digital Age has been
the observed growth in computer processing power, which doubles
nearly every two years.3 The exponential growth in the capacity of
computer processors has had a particularly profound effect on the
expansion of the internet. According to data published by the World
Bank, the percentage of the world’s population with access to the
internet has increased from less than two percent in 1996 to over forty-

* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to the editors and
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help in editing this Comment. Thanks, also,
to Professor John Nockleby for his guidance. Lastly, thanks to my family and friends for their
support throughout my law school career.
1. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV.
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pacewith-technology.
2. Id.
3. David Frideman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71,
81 (2002).
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three percent in 2015.4 Today, more than three billion people use the
internet and that number continues to grow exponentially.5
In 1986, under Title II of the larger Electronic Communication
Privacy Act, Congress created the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA” or the “Act”) which “protects the privacy of the contents of
files stored by service providers and of records held about the
subscriber by service providers.”6 In 1986, the internet was still in its
infancy; the drafters of the SCA had no way to foresee that
multinational companies would be able to store vast amounts of digital
content and easily transfer such information across borders at
lightning speed.7 Thirty years later, the internet has evolved from a
collection of small networks into a global system for electronically
transmitting communications, while the laws regulating the protection
of those communications have remained the same.
This Comment will argue that the Second Circuit correctly
applied the relevant provisions of the SCA to the facts of a recent case
involving Microsoft—Microsoft Corp. v. United States—8but that
there is no reasonable interpretation of the SCA as it currently stands
that would adequately balance the legitimate needs of U.S. law
enforcement and the privacy interests of U.S. citizens. Part II of this
Comment will describe the facts of Microsoft Corp. Part III will
examine the Second Circuit’s application of the SCA. Part IV will
analyze the merits of the Court’s reasoning and discuss the practical
implications of the Court’s decision, including the consequences that
might have followed from an opposite interpretation of the SCA.
Finally, this Comment will discuss the merits of several proposed
legislative and policy reforms.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Microsoft Corporation operates a “web-based e-mail service”
known as Outlook.com.9 In providing users with web-based access to
e-mail accounts, Microsoft saves each user’s e-mail information and
4. Internet Users (Per 100 People), WORLD BANK GRP. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
5. Steve Dent, There Are Now 3 Billion Internet Users, Mostly In Rich Countries, ENGADGET
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014/11/25/3-billion-internet-users.
6. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 226 (Lynch, J., concurring).
8. 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
9. Id. at 202 (majority opinion).
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content on a network of servers located in massive datacenters
operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries.10 Microsoft oversees more
than one hundred datacenter facilities across more than forty countries
and hosts more than 200 online services, used by over one billion
customers and over twenty million businesses around the globe.11 In
an effort to reduce network latency, Microsoft typically stores a
customer’s e-mail information and content at a datacenter located near
the physical locale identified by the user as its own when subscribing
to the service.12 However, Microsoft does not verify the accuracy of
the user-provided information before its systems migrate the data
according to company protocol.13
Once the user’s content has been transferred to a foreign
datacenter, Microsoft removes nearly all of the information associated
with the account from its U.S.-based servers, retaining only basic
account information and some non-content e-mail information in its
U.S. facilities.14 While Microsoft maintains that user data stored in
Dublin is only accessible from the Dublin datacenter, Microsoft’s
database management program allows it to retrieve account data
stored on any of its servers globally from its offices in the United
States.15
In Microsoft Corp., a magistrate judge for the Southern District
of New York issued a Search and Seizure Warrant under section 2703
of the Stored Communications Act, directing Microsoft to seize and
produce the contents of an e-mail account that it maintains for one of
its customers.16 The judge found probable cause to believe the account
was being used in furtherance of narcotics trafficking.17 However, due
to jurisdictional limitations, Microsoft moved to quash the warrant to
the extent that it required Microsoft to produce the contents of the
customer’s e-mail account stored on a server located in its Dublin
datacenter.18

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 202–03.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id.
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In support of its motion to quash, Microsoft referred to
Congress’s use of the term “warrant” to identify the instrument
authorized under the Act, because “[w]arrants traditionally carry
territorial limitations.”19 Microsoft cited 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to support its position that a court-issued warrant
permits law enforcement agencies “to seize items at locations in the
United States and in United States-controlled areas . . . but their
authority generally does not extend further.”20 Conversely, the
government attached little importance to the instrument’s label.
Instead, the government argued that the scope of a warrant under the
SCA is more akin to that of a subpoena, which “requires the recipient
to deliver records, physical objects, and other materials to the
government no matter where those documents are located, so long as
they are subject to the recipient’s custody or control.”21
The magistrate judge, affirmed by the district court, denied
Microsoft’s motion to quash and concluded that Microsoft was
obligated to produce the customer’s content, “wherever it might be
stored.”22 The judge likened the instrument to a subpoena, rather than
a traditional warrant, on the ground that an SCA warrant does not
involve government officials entering the premises of the internet
service provider to seize the relevant email account.23 Accordingly,
the magistrate judge determined that Congress intended the Act’s
warrant provisions to incorporate obligations similar to those
associated with a subpoena and therefore held that Microsoft was
required to produce information in its possession or under its control,
irrespective of its location.24
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court’s ruling and concluded that the SCA does not authorize a U.S.
court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United
States-based service provider to obtain the contents of a customer’s
electronic communications stored on servers located abroad.25

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 201.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 222.
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Second Circuit emphasized the strong presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, given that “the SCA is silent
as to the reach of the statute as a whole and as to the reach of its
warrant provisions in particular.”26 When interpreting the laws of
Congress, courts presume that such laws are intended to “apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless a contrary
intent clearly appears.”27 Here, the court followed the two-prong
approach set forth in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.28 to
decide whether the presumption against extraterritoriality forbids the
proposed application of the SCA.29 First, the court must first look to
the plain language of the statute to determine whether Congress
intended it to have extraterritorial effect.30 Second, if congressional
intent is not found in the plain language of the statute, the court must
rely on common canons of statutory construction to “identify[] the
statute’s focus,” and determine whether, based on the facts, the
challenged application is unlawfully “extraterritorial.”31
A. Prong 1: The Plain Language of the SCA
In Microsoft Corp., the Court first analyzed whether the plain
language of the SCA contemplates extraterritorial application.32 The
Court readily determined that the SCA’s provisions permitting a
service provider’s disclosure in response to a duly obtained warrant do
not mention any extraterritorial application.33 Moreover, the
government was unable to point to any provision that even implicitly
alluded to such application.34
Turning to the legal significance of the term “warrant,” the court
indicated that a legal term of art is to be interpreted “in accordance
with [its] traditional legal meaning, unless the statute contains a
persuasive indication that Congress intended otherwise.”35 Here, the
court explained that “warrants and subpoenas are, and have long been,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 210 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 212.
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distinct legal instruments”36 and that “[s]ection 2703 of the SCA
recognizes this distinction and, unsurprisingly, uses the ‘warrant’
requirement to signal . . . a greater level of protection to priority stored
communications, and ‘subpoenas’ to signal (and provide) a lesser
level.”37 The court highlighted the fact that the statute explicitly refers
to both instruments and yet it “does not use the terms interchangeably
. . . [n]or does it use the word ‘hybrid’ to describe a Stored
Communications Act warrant.”38 Thus, the court found no reasonable
basis to infer that Congress intended a warrant under the SCA to
function as a subpoena.39
B. Prong 2: Statutory Construction
The second prong of the approach, set forth in Morrison, requires
a court to examine the “‘territorial events or relationships’ that are the
‘focus’ of the relevant statutory provision.”40 According to the court
in Morrison, “[i]f the domestic contacts presented by the case fall
within the ‘focus’ of the statutory provision or are ‘the objects of the
statute’s solicitude,’ then the application of the provision is not
unlawfully extraterritorial.”41 Here, the Second Circuit relied on
several common canons of statutory construction to support its
conclusion that the “focus” of the SCA’s warrant provision was to
protect the privacy of stored communications.42
1. The Plain Meaning of the Text in the SCA
First, the court referred to the plain meaning of the text in the
Act’s warrant provision. The court pointed out that “[w]arrants under
Section 2703 [are issued] under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, whose Rule 41 is undergirded by the Constitution’s
protections of citizens’ privacy against unlawful searches and
seizures.”43 The court also called attention to the fact that the warrant
language in section 2703 appears in a statute entitled the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, “suggesting privacy as a key
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 214.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 216 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)).
Id. (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267).
Id. at 217.
Id.
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concern.”44 Thus, the court concluded, the language of both the SCA’s
warrant provision and the act as a whole suggest that the privacy of
the stored communications is the “object of the statute’s solicitude”
and “the focus of its provisions.”45
2. The Structure of the SCA
The Court also cited the statute’s structure as a major indicator of
the Act’s focus on the need to protect users’ privacy interests.46 The
court explained that the SCA primarily imposes obligations to protect
the privacy of electronic communications and that “[d]isclosure is
permitted only as an exception to those primary obligations and is
subject to conditions imposed in [section] 2703.”47 Thus, although the
SCA does prescribe means by which law enforcement may obtain
access to user content, “it does so in the context of a primary emphasis
on protecting user content,” which the court described as the “object
of the statute’s solicitude.”48 The court mentioned in dicta that if the
Act were truly focused on abetting law enforcement and disclosure, it
would have instead created “a rebuttable presumption of law
enforcement access to content premised on a minimal showing of
legitimate interest.”49 But as the Court pointed out, “this is not what
the Act does.”50 Thus, an examination of the Act’s structure prompted
the Court to conclude that the interest of law enforcement in
compelling disclosure is secondary to the protection of users’ privacy
interests.
3. The Legislative History of the SCA
Finally, the court referred to the Act’s legislative history, which
indicated that when Congress passed the SCA as part of the broader
Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, its primary goal was

44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267) (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 218 (“Section 2701 . . . protects the privacy interests of users in many aspects of their
stored communications from intrusion by unauthorized third parties. Section 2702 generally
prohibits providers from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication that is in electronic
storage subject to certain enumerated exceptions. Section 2703 governs the circumstances in which
information associated with stored communications may be disclosed to the government, creating
the elaborate hierarchy of privacy protections that we have described.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 217.
49. Id. at 218.
50. Id.

50.3 LISKANICH (DO NOT DELETE)

544

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/23/2018 4:24 PM

[Vol. 50:537

to protect user privacy in the context of new technology that required
user interaction with service providers.51 The legislative history also
revealed that, with regard to governmental access, “Congress sought
to ensure that the protections traditionally afforded by the Fourth
Amendment extended to the electronic forum.”52 While the Court
acknowledged that “Congress did not overlook law enforcement needs
in formulating the statute,” based on a report from the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the Court found that those needs were not “the primary
motivator[s] for the enactment.”53
C. The Second Circuit’s Conclusion
Having determined that the SCA’s primary focus is on user
privacy, the court concluded that the proposed execution of the
warrant would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of the
Act.54 Because the content subject to the warrant is stored in, and
would be seized from, the Dublin datacenter, and because Microsoft
must necessarily interact with the Dublin datacenter in order to retrieve
the information, the court determined that “the conduct that falls
within the focus of the SCA would occur outside the United States.”55
While the court acknowledged that the Act’s focus on the
customer’s privacy might imply that the customer’s actual location or
citizenship would be relevant to the extraterritoriality analysis, it
ultimately held that “the invasion of the customer’s privacy takes place
under the SCA where the customer’s protected content is accessed,”
or, in this case, “where it is seized by Microsoft, acting as an agent of
the government.”56 Thus, although Microsoft has the capacity to
access information stored on any one of its servers located abroad,
obtaining such information necessarily implicates the foreign
subsidiary that manages the server and, consequently, the laws of the
foreign country in which the server is located.57 Therefore, the Second
Circuit held the SCA warrant could not be used to lawfully compel

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 201.
Id. at 219 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99–647, at 19).
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id.
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Microsoft to produce the contents of a customer’s e-mail account
stored exclusively in Ireland.58
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION
A. Implications of the Second Circuit’s Ruling
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision, U.S. companies
have already begun storing their information in data centers located
outside the United States’ territorial jurisdiction and beyond the reach
of U.S. warrants.59 As one commentator points out: “[d]ata center
operations have been booming for years, but there’s a new urgency in
setting them up to help businesses establish a creative solution to
privacy regulations.”60 Microsoft is not the only major internet service
provider to make use of overseas data centers; companies such as
Apple, Google, and Facebook already have substantial infrastructure
in Ireland as well.61 If Congress does not take action, more and more
companies will begin taking advantage of the Second Circuit’s
decision.
By preventing SCA warrants from reaching data stored abroad,
the court’s decision functions as a substantial obstacle to the
investigative efforts of law enforcement. As the magistrate judge who
issued the warrant noted, it is quite easy for a wrongdoer to “mislead
a service provider that has overseas storage facilities into storing
content outside the United States.”62 Here, the Court condemned as
unlawfully extraterritorial the government’s attempt to compel a
U.S.-based service provider to surrender information that is accessible
from its U.S. facilities. Because the location of electronic documents
is, “in important ways, merely virtual,”63 such an outcome seems
wholly incongruous. But despite the apparent illogicality of the
Court’s ruling, all things considered, the Second Circuit’s decision
was the optimal one.
58. Id. at 221.
59. Stephen Dockery, Data Localization Takes Off as Regulation Uncertainty Continues,
WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/06/06/data- localization
-takes-off-as-regulation-uncertainty-continues.
60. Id.
61. Kate Conger, Microsoft Triumphs in Warrant Case Against U.S. Government, TECH
CRUNCH (July 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/14/microsoft-wins-second-circuitwarrant.
62. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 221.
63. Id. at 229 (Lynch, J., concurring).

50.3 LISKANICH (DO NOT DELETE)

546

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/23/2018 4:24 PM

[Vol. 50:537

B. The Second Circuit Correctly Determined the Scope of the SCA’s
Warrant Provision
The Second Circuit correctly applied the Stored Communications
Act in Microsoft Corp.; however, the statute is antiquated and does not
present a workable framework for similar disputes in the future.
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Gerald E. Lynch emphasized the
need for congressional action to revise a badly outdated statute.64 As
Judge Lynch explained, “there are significant practical and policy
limitations on the desirability of” “undertaking to regulate conduct
that occurs beyond our borders.”65 Given the possibility of serious
diplomatic repercussions, “the decision about whether and when to
apply U.S. law to actions occurring abroad is a question that is left
entirely to Congress.”66 This is because, as the majority noted,
“Congress, rather than the courts, has the facilities necessary to make
policy decisions in the delicate field of international relations.”67 Here,
the Court was careful not to overstep its mandate by usurping the role
of Congress and rightfully declined to give the warrant extraterritorial
effect.
Although the government’s position in this case seems logical as
a matter of policy, an opposite outcome could have had serious
negative implications. As Alan Raul and Kwaku Akowuah observed,
“the Court was sensitive to issues of consistency and reciprocity
between U.S. and foreign states.”68 Consistency and reciprocity are
significant concerns within the context of the present case. Some
experts worry that “if the U.S. insists on the power to force transfer of
data to the U.S. from foreign servers, other countries—including those
more aggressive than the U.S.—will insist on a reciprocal right. This
could, of course, diminish the privacy rights of Americans.”69
Limiting law enforcement officials’ access to information may make
it more difficult for them to adequately protect citizens. However,
given the vast amount of user data managed by internet service
providers and the recent uptick in cyber-attacks on multinational
64. Id. at 222.
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 210 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
68. Alan Raul & Kwaku Akowuah, 2nd Cir. Microsoft Ruling: A Plea For Congressional
Action, LAW 360 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/aa0bdaf4-c3bd-4c87a786-a26308a8c8be/?context=1000516.
69. Id.
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corporations, the interest in protecting user privacy is of the utmost
importance and deserves serious consideration.
Moreover, as Judge Lynch acknowledged, there is no evidence
that Congress has ever formally weighed the costs and benefits of
authorizing court orders of the sort at issue in this case, primarily
because “[t]he SCA became law at a time when there was no reason
to do so.”70 This case highlights the profound tension between several
conflicting interests: the legitimate needs of U.S. law enforcement to
uphold the rule of law, the rights of foreign sovereigns to govern free
from U.S. intervention, and the privacy interests of U.S. citizens who
engage in on-line activity. Given the seriousness of the interests at
stake, Congress should be the one to decide “whether the benefits of
permitting subpoena-like orders of the kind issued here outweigh the
costs of doing so.”71
In short, the Second Circuit’s decision should not be regarded as
a “rational policy outcome, let alone celebrated as a milestone in
protecting privacy.”72 Rather, the holding functions as “a plea for
Congress to hash out the right policy balance. . . ,”73 and symbolizes
courts’ unwillingness to make such decisions.
C. Possible Solutions
1. Data Localization
As a result of the Second Circuit’s decision, Congress may feel
compelled to pass strict data localization rules that would require
technology companies to store user data in datacenters located within
the United States’ borders.74 Under such rules, U.S.-based service
providers would be unable to evade legitimate attempts by U.S. law
enforcement to access customers’ information simply by storing that
information in overseas datacenters. However, the adoption of data
localization rules—which effectively require data to be stored based
on political considerations rather than technical efficiency—would
“contribute to a trend of atomizing today’s global Internet into

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 231 (Lynch, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 233.
Raul, supra note 68.
Conger, supra note 61.
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country-level networks.”75 Russia already imposes a strict data
localization requirement, and in the last year alone more than twenty
governments, including France and Brazil, have proposed similar
legislation.76 As one commentator points out, “[f]or many
[governments], the stated reason has been not domestic monitoring,
but rather protection against foreign government spying.”77 While
localization rules may seem politically advantageous, internet experts
have long objected to the adoption of data localization rules on a
number of grounds.78
First, many experts have reservations as to whether localization
rules actually afford users greater protection, since such laws
effectively give local governments greater access to user data.79 One
commentator likened data localization to “a Balkanization or
splintering of the Internet.”80 The same commentator argued that
localization “makes the public at large less secure,” because “[f]oreign
countries may not respect the laws governing security, resulting in
more access by state-sponsored surveillance or espionage.”81 As a
result, a data localization requirement in the United States would
“pose risks to political activists and human rights defenders by making
their information more accessible to authorities.”82
Second, critics argue that data localization laws would effectively
act as barriers to trade by placing a substantial burden on global
service providers in the form of increased costs.83 For example, PayPal
was forced to suspend its operations in Turkey after the Turkish
government demanded that PayPal localize its infrastructure in order
to continue operating.84 Ramsey Homsany, general counsel of the file-

75. Katharine Kendrick, Risky Business: Data Localization, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015, 5:08
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/02/19/risky-business-data-localization/#155d6f5
38c8b.
76. Conger, supra note 61.
77. Kendrick, supra note 75.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Jocelyn Dong, Silicon Valley Tech Execs: Surveillance Threatens Digital Economy, PALO
ALTO WEEKLY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2014/10/09/tech-execssurveillance-is-harming-digital-economy.
81. Id.
82. See Kendrick, supra note 75.
83. Dong, supra note 80.
84. Emre Peker, PayPal to Exit Turkey After Regulator Denies Payments License, WALL ST.
J. (May 31, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/paypal-to-exit-turkey-after-regulator-deniespayments-license-1464720574.
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hosting service Dropbox, has said that the cost of setting up data
centers across the globe would be prohibitively high—even for an
established company like Dropbox.85 According to Homsany,
adoption of the data localization rules proposed by twenty foreign
governments would dramatically restrict entrepreneurship and limit
competition by making it “impossible” to start new technology
companies.86 Thus, adopting a data localization requirement would be
imprudent because it would stifle innovation and economic growth.
Third, the fragmentation of the internet would inhibit the
dissemination of data and lead to greater inefficiency. According to
one article, “Colin Stretch, general counsel of Facebook, said that
service to users would become less efficient, slower and less
personalized because of companies’ inability to take advantage of
cloud-based storage that a well-networked Internet enables.”87
Richard Bennett, the vice-chair of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Standards Association, explains that
“[compliance] with data localization mandates not only requires more
servers, it also requires more synchronization activity, which in turn
requires more transmission capacity. This leads to a more complex
Internet overall, which raises issues for Internet reliability.”88 Benett
argues that no matter how “well-intentioned data localization
mandates may be, over-broad restrictions on trans-border data flows
are harmful to national security, destructive to the growth of the
Internet, inconsistent with innovation, and bad for every user or firm
who depends on the reliability of the Internet.”89 Therefore, Congress
should resist the urge to implement strict data localization rules.
2. Strengthening Existing Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Some have also suggested enhancing the mutual legal assistance
treaty process.90 The term “mutual legal assistance treaty,” or MLAT,
refers to a category of treaties, generally bilateral, under which the
United States and another country agree to use their respective legal
85. Dong, supra note 80. Dropbox provides data storage services to roughly three hundred
million users, “[seventy percent] of whom are outside the United States.” Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Richard Bennett, Surge in Data Localization Laws Spells Trouble for Internet Users, TECH
POL’Y DAILY (May 10, 2016), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/surge-in-datalocalization-laws-spells-trouble-for-internet-users.
89. Id.
90. Raul, supra note 68.
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processes to aid each other in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal matters.91 The Irish government reportedly backed Microsoft
in the present case, arguing that “the U.S. could pursue the data
through existing treaties with Ireland rather than trying to circumvent
the country’s sovereignty with a U.S.-based search warrant.”92 Thus,
diplomatic engagement could potentially put the U.S. government in
a position to sustain the interests of law enforcement and further
international comity without sacrificing the privacy of millions of
Americans.
While some foreign nations have been reluctant to cooperate with
the United States in such matters ever since Edward Snowden shed
light on the NSA’s controversial surveillance activities,93 the United
States and the European Union have taken major steps towards
implementing the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,” which seeks to establish
a safe framework for transatlantic data flows that will ensure greater
protection for individuals and legal certainty for business.94 However,
a number of countries in Europe and around the world have recently
implemented localization regulations, which some believe were
intended to protect their citizens against U.S. espionage.95 Thus, the
U.S. must strive to engage foreign nations outside the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield and create an open dialogue; doing so will create opportunities
for cooperation and potentially help restore trust in the U.S.
government. If not, the U.S. government will be left with no formal
means of garnering support to conduct law enforcement investigations
in those countries with which it has not entered into an MLAT.96 Still,
the benefits of mutual legal assistance treaty reform are unlikely to be
realized in the short run because the negotiation process often moves
quite slowly.97 Thus, the problem is one which also calls for legislative
action.

91. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Validity, Construction, and Application of Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLATs), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 375 (2013).
92. Conger, supra note 61.
93. Dong, supra note 80.
94. Press Release, European Comm’n, Statement by Vice-President Ansip and Commissioner
Jourová on the Occasion of the Adoption by Member States of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 8,
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2443_en.htm.
95. Id.
96. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 221 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
97. Raul, supra note 68.
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3. Proposed Statutory Reform
While the U.S. must continue to pursue bilateral negotiations with
foreign nations, Congress should seriously consider reforming the
Stored Communications Act. Multinational service providers should
not have the power to unlawfully obstruct the investigative efforts of
the U.S. Justice Department and burden its ability to pursue matters
related to domestic security. At the same time, the Justice Department
must follow appropriate procedures that are substantively fair, “for it
is procedure that marks . . . the difference between rule by law and rule
by fiat.”98
Pursuant to the government’s argument in the present case, one
possibility would be for Congress to submit legislation that would
enable a duly authorized prosecutor to lawfully obtain a modified SCA
warrant having extraterritorial effect.99 Such an instrument would
hypothetically compel a recipient to produce electronically stored
information located on an overseas server that is under its control,
even when the recipient is “merely a caretaker for another individual
or entity and that individual, not the subpoena recipient, has a
protectable privacy interest in the item.”100 But as one expert noted,
“[i]f the U.S. government’s position was validated by the Second
Circuit, it would have forced multinational companies such as
Microsoft to violate the laws of Ireland and potentially other countries
in the future to comply with U.S. law.”101
Therefore, if the modified SCA warrant does not comply with an
existing MLAT treaty or multilateral agreement, the recipient of such
an instrument may be forced to choose between violating a U.S. court
order and being held in contempt, and violating the law of the foreign
country in which it also does business. As one commentator notes,
“[t]his would be an untenable position for not just Microsoft but any
international company that has operations and customers in the U.S.
and around the world.”102 On one hand, many multinational internet
service providers would almost certainly comply with a U.S. court
order, even if it meant violating the data export laws of a foreign
98. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
99. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 215.
100. Id.
101. Bradley Shear, Microsoft Search Warrant Case Is a Win for Privacy, LAW 360 (July 22,
2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b6306d51-f226-4ba1-a854-0292f19ab11c/?contex
t=1000516.
102. Id.
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sovereign, in order to continue to avail themselves of access to U.S.
markets and the protection of the U.S. rule of law. Nonetheless, it
would be unwise as a matter of economic policy for Congress to put
these businesses in such a position, because doing so would inhibit
U.S. tech-startups from expanding their operations to foreign markets
and might also deter foreign tech companies from expanding to the
U.S.103 Such a policy would erode the U.S. tax base for both foreign
and domestic-source income. Therefore, any proposed legislative
reform regarding the international reach of the SCA’s warrant
provision will necessarily require lawmakers to take into account the
interests of other sovereign nations.
Many are hopeful that the Second Circuit’s decision will inspire
“cooperative efforts among government officials, service providers
and privacy advocates” to solve the many issues surrounding
international data storage and government access to electronically
stored information.104 While there have been a handful of unsuccessful
attempts to modernize the SCA in the recent past, several members of
Congress recently proposed legislation that would modernize the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).105
In May, a bipartisan group of senators proposed the International
Communications Privacy Act (“ICPA”), which would allow the use of
domestic search warrants to retrieve electronic communications of
U.S. citizens, permanent residents and some foreign nationals,
wherever the individuals and content are located.106 This sort of
bright-line rule would provide clearer guidance to courts applying the
law. Moreover, the proposed ICPA would “[r]eform the MLAT
process by providing greater accessibility, transparency, and
accountability.”107 Although the legislative process can be quite
arduous, commentator Bradley Shear is confident that “[t]he U.S. as
the birthplace of the Internet is perfectly situated to serve as a model
103. Id.
104. Raul, supra note 68.
105. Press Release, Congresswoman Suzan Delbe, Reps. DelBene, Marino Introduce
International Communications Privacy Act (May 25, 2016), https://delbene.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/reps-delbene-marino-introduce-international-communications-privacy-act.
106. Randall Samborn, Esq. & Samantha Kruse, The Government Isn’t Winning the Crypto
War but Is Anyone?, 29 WESTLAW J. ENT. INDUS. 1, 2 (2016).
107. Press Release, Orrin Hatch U.S. Sen. for Utah, Hatch, Coons, Heller Introduce Bipartisan
International Communications Privacy Act (May 25, 2016), http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2016/5/hatch-coons-heller-introduce-bipartisan-international-communications-privacyact.
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for the rest of the world on how to properly balance digital privacy
with lawful access.”108 However, it is imperative that Congress act
sooner than later.
V. CONCLUSION
The Microsoft case illustrates the challenges that courts face in
applying an antiquated statute to contemporary issues concerning
privacy and technology. Congress must act to implement a revised
regulatory framework that is specifically tailored to the modern digital
landscape. Strict data localization requirements are incongruous with
achieving this end, because such policies fail to account for the
complexities of today’s global system of interdependent networks.
Any attempt at legislative reform must take into account the needs and
priorities of foreign sovereign nations and aim to streamline the
existing MLAT process. Unless and until Congress replaces the Stored
Communications Act, courts faced with situations like the one in the
present case will inevitably reach similarly perverse results.

108. Shear, supra note 101.
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